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Abstract: The paper purports to examine the rationale in subsidizing healthcare in the 
developing economies solely from the standpoint of economic growth with the help of a 
three-sector, full-employment small economy model with exogenous labour market 
imperfection and a non-traded sector providing healthcare services. Consumption of 
healthcare services emanates positive externalities and raises the efficiency of workers. 
There is provision for providing public subsidy on the consumption of health services. 
The analysis finds that the socially optimal consumption subsidy on health is not 
necessarily positive and crucially hinges on factors like degree of labour market 
imperfection, quality of services provided by the healthcare sector and its production 
technology. These results lead to a few important policy implications in the context of the 
developing countries. Finally, this analysis provides a theoretical justification why the 
magnitude of public spending on healthcare services is significantly lower in the 
developing countries vis-à-vis the developed nations.  
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Is it reasonable to subsidize healthcare in Developing Nations? A question purely 
from the growth perspective 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Public spending on healthcare is an important agenda of the government in any country. 
Healthcare is a merit good that generates positive consumption externalities through 
human capital formation that is conducive to economic growth. In an economy where 
there is a sector that emanates consumption externalities; and, there are no other 
distortions a consumption subsidy is the right instrument to deal with externalities and 
improve social welfare. The simple argument is that a consumption subsidy on the good 
would increase its demand and increase the producer price given its supply. The forces of 
free market would, therefore, compensate the producers and induce them to produce 
more; thereby, increasing social welfare. Hence, from the pure growth perspective 
consumption of healthcare services should be subsidized.  
 
Governments across countries whether developed or developing spend substantial 
amounts of their budgets in providing health subsidies. For example, as per the World 
Bank dataset US spent 8.3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare in 
2012. The corresponding figures for UK, Germany and Japan were 7.8, 8.6 and 8.3 
percent, respectively. On the other hand, the developing countries in general spent much 
less on healthcare compared to the developed world. For example, China, India and 
Bangladesh spent only 3.0, 1.3 and 1.2 percent of their respective GDP in providing 
subsidy on health.1 The figures for per capita public expenditure on healthcare are also 
substantially higher in developed countries compared to those in developing nations. This 
difference may arise due to the fact that in a developing country like India the 
government has to spend a substantial amount of its resources on redistributive programs 
with a view to mitigate poverty and income inequality. In this context, it is important to 
note that public expenditure on healthcare in developing countries by itself plays a 
                                                 
1
 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL.ZS  
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redistributive role. This is because the poor people can spend only a meager amount from 
their own pockets on health. Public expenditures on both preventive and curative 
healthcare services help them much in getting at least some access to healthcare 
services.2,3 
 
Setting aside the redistributive role of public expenditure on health let us solely 
concentrate on the aspect of economic growth. In an economy where consumption 
externalities are the only source of distortion the socially optimal consumption subsidy is 
unambiguously positive. Is this the case in a small open (say, developing) economy in the 
presence of other distortion(s) e.g. labour market distortion? Another important question 
is whether the optimal subsidy anyhow depends on the quality of health services provided 
by the healthcare sector.  
 
The present paper is aimed at providing answers to the above questions in terms of a 
three-sector full-employment small open economy model with exogenous labour market 
imperfection and a non-traded sector providing healthcare services. Consumption of 
healthcare services emanates positive externalities through improving health conditions 
and hence the efficiency of workers. Wages across sectors differ implying the existence 
of labour market distortion. Hence, this is a situation where multiple distortions coexist. 
There is provision for public subsidy on health designed to deal with externalities. In this 
backdrop, we have shown that the socially optimal consumption subsidy on health is not 
necessarily positive and crucially hinges on the degree of labour market imperfection, the 
quality of services provided by the healthcare sector and the production technology of 
this sector. We have also pointed out a few important policy implications of our 
                                                 
2
 In the developing countries, the greater emphasis is on curative healthcare spending which often 
reflects a bias towards the better-off people while preventive healthcare expenditure with much 
larger externalities would have been of greater help to the economically weaker section of the 
population. See Cevik and Tasar (2013) in this context. 
 
3
 These aspects have been discussed in detail in Musgrove (1999), Self and Grabowski (2003) 
etc. 
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theoretical findings. The policy to subsidize healthcare should be accompanied by 
measures designed to improve the quality of the services rendered by this sector and to 
lessen the degree of imperfection prevailing in the labour market. These policies, if 
undertaken concurrently, would increase the possibility that the health subsidy would 
successfully be able to deal with consumption externalities and improve social welfare. 
Finally, this analysis also provides a theoretical justification why the magnitude of public 
spending on healthcare services is significantly lower in the developing countries relative 
to the developed nations.  
 
 
 
2.  The Model 
 
 
3. Comparative statics 
 
In this paper, as discussed earlier, we are interested to examine whether the provision of a 
consumption subsidy on healthcare is desirable from the perspective of social welfare of 
this small open developing economy. To put it differently, we would like to investigate 
whether the optimal rate of consumption subsidy in the present context is indeed positive. 
 
Totally, differentiating equations (1) – (12) the following proposition can easily be 
derived.4 
Proposition 1: A consumption subsidy on healthcare leads to:  (i) an increase in the price 
of healthcare services, GP ; (ii) an increase in the  return to capital of type N i.e. R ; (iii) an 
expansion of sector G ; and, (iv) an expansion (a contraction) of sector 1 (sector 2) both 
in terms of output and employment.  
 
Proposition 2: The socially optimal rate of health subsidy is not necessarily positive. It is 
positive (zero) (negative) if and only if 1 1 2( * ){ * ( )} ( )( )LG L Kh
NG
W W a XW hE L σθ λ β
θ λ
−
> = < .
 
                                                 
4
 This has been proved in Appendix 1. 
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From equation (16) the following three corollaries readily follow. 
 
Corollary 1: The possibility that the socially optimal health subsidy would be positive 
increases with an increase in hE and vice versa. 
 
Corollary 2: If 0σ = i.e. if technology of production in the healthcare sector (sectorG ) is 
of the fixed-coefficient type, the socially optimal health subsidy is zero. 
 
Corollary 3: In the absence of any labour market imperfection i.e. when, *W W= , the 
optimal subsidy is unequivocally positive.  
   
 
An essential implication of corollary 3 is that even though the optimal subsidy in this 
economy is positive its magnitude would be less than the case with no or very small 
degree of labour market distortion. This probably provides a theoretical justification why 
the magnitude of public spending on healthcare services is significantly lower in the 
developing countries vis-à-vis the developed nations which are relatively free of such 
type of distortion. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
In the small open economy literature it is a well-known result that in the case of 
consumption externalities the consumption of the good that emanates pecuniary benefits 
should be subsidized to improve social welfare. Healthcare is such a good/service which 
is universally provided to consumers at a subsidized price. In a model with no other 
distortion there is no gainsaying that healthcare services should be subsidized. The issue 
 6
does not remain that much straightforward in the presence of multiple distortions.5 This 
paper examines the optimality of the health subsidy in the context of a small open 
developing economy with labour market distortion and positive consumption 
externalities. A three-sector, full-employment model has been considered for analytical 
purpose where the two traded sectors form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem while sector G , 
a non-traded sector, produces healthcare services with labour and a sector-specific input, 
capital of type N . The consumption of commodityG creates positive externalities and 
raises the efficiency of workers in the economy. There is provision for health subsidy 
with a view to deal with externalities and improve national welfare. Workers in sector 1 
receive a low wage,W while in the other two sectors the wage rate is *W with *W W> . 
Thus, there is labour market imperfection. In this setting, the paper has investigated the 
optimality of the health subsidy. The analysis has found that the health subsidy leads to 
reallocation of labour between the sectors and raises the effective labour endowment 
through externalities. These two effects are called labour reallocation effect (LRE) and 
labour endowment effect (LEE), respectively both of which affect social welfare through 
changing aggregate wage income. The optimality of the subsidy policy crucially depends 
on the relative strengths of the two opposite effects. The optimal subsidy is positive 
(negative) if the LEE (LRE) dominates over the LRE (LEE). Therefore, the analysis 
finds that the optimal health subsidy in this developing economy is not necessarily 
positive and crucially depends on factors like production technology in the healthcare 
sector, the quality of services provided and the degree of labour market distortion. The 
last two results leads to a few important policy implications. Before providing the health 
subsidy the government should take the initiatives to improve the quality of the services 
provided by this sector as much as possible and resort to labour market reform that is 
designed to mitigate distortion prevailing in the labour market. These policies, if 
undertaken concomitantly, would increase the probability that the health subsidy would 
successfully be able to deal with consumption externalities and improve social welfare. 
                                                 
5
 In the presence of multiple distortions the effect(s) of any parametric changes on social welfare 
(or any other objective(s)) might change enormously compared to the one distortion case. This is 
because the effects of different distortions might move in the two opposite directions nullifying 
each other’s effects. Hence the net effect depends on the relative magnitudes of different effects. 
This is a well-known result in the theory of international trade. 
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Furthermore, the study provides some justification why the governments in the 
developing economies spend/should spend much less on healthcare vis-à-vis their 
counterparts in the developed nations.  
 
Finally, it should be clearly spelt out that this analysis has been carried out assuming that 
social welfare depends solely on national income and the distributional aspect of health 
subsidy has completely been ignored. If that objective is also brought in the picture apart 
from the growth objective there might be grounds for providing health subsidy even 
though the policy fails to deliver the goods from the perspective of economic growth.    
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